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KEY INSIGHTS 
1. 100% inspection level would be hard to handle 
at ports, especially with the queues created at 
gates.  
2. Due to longer port operations, lead times 
increase and companies need to bear higher 
safety stocks. 
 
Introduction 
Given that 20 million containers travel the world 
every year and few of them are physically inspected, 
it is very easy to illegally transport people, arms or 
even Weapons of Mass Destruction. Government 
Accountability Office’s investigators managed to 
import radioactive material to US using false 
documents. 
 
All developed technologies’ goals in the 
containerized global supply chain used to be the 
increase in efficiency in terms of cost and time. The 
main objective of these policies was the reduction in 
shrinkage and misrouting of the containers. Security 
in the transportation of material had never been the 
objective of any initiative, and the security measures 
in place at ports were not regulated by any 
international organisation. 
 
The fact that containers are visually anonymous and 
a very small fraction are physically inspected makes 
it easier for terrorists to use the supply chain to 
transport illegal materials around the world. 
 
Since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre 
in 2001, the US has increasingly focused on 
developing security measures to avoid thefts and 
transportation of illegal materials. Many international 
programs initiated by the US, have been developed 
to reduce the vulnerability of the containerized 
supply chain. It has been estimated that the 
detonation of a nuclear weapon in a port could incur 
a cost in the range of $55 to $220 billion (Abt et al, 
2003). If the material transported is not properly 
checked and the probability of intercepting an attack 
is not increased, the effects of terrorists’ attacks 
could become more frequent over time. 
 
Because of the attack on September 11, 2001, the 
US developed the 9/11 Act, which requires that by 
2012, 100% of US bound containers, must be 
scanned at the port of embarkation. This 
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requirement has caused much criticism regarding 
the costs and the additional delays incurred by this 
new procedure and its feasibility at foreign ports has 
not yet been proven. 
 
The aim of such policies is always to improve 
security, but the efficiency of the supply chain might 
be negatively influenced.  Can the US requirements 
of 9/11 Act be met at international ports without 
having negative effects to the global trade? 
 
Because this question is too vast and the differences 
in ports make it impossible to generalise at global 
levels, this thesis only analyses the background and 
current situation at the international level. It also 
provides a summary of the most important 
international programs currently in place and 
evaluates the feasibility of the 100% scanning 
requirement under CSI security scheme. 
 
The 3 layers of the Containerized Supply Chain 
The global supply chain is composed by different 
members through whom the raw materials are 
transformed into finished products and are delivered 
to customers. Once the freight is being transported 
via container many other players intervene in the 
supply chain. 
 
These actors can be vessels, port facilities, railcars, 
trucks and the proper container. These are called 
the physical components containing goods, 
information and financial flows. When the number of 
interventions increase in the handling of any 
container, it becomes harder to track the movements 
and to assign responsibilities within the supply 
chain. 
 
The supply chain can be divided in 3 different layers: 
the transaction layer, the logistics layer and the 
regulatory layer (Willis, 2004). These layers are 
interdependent and interacting networks. 
 
1) The transaction layer 
The transaction layer is based on information and 
physical flows between all the members of the 
supply chain. These members are connected 
between them through contracts, product 
specifications and transaction records that allow the 
correct movement of the freight. 
2) The logistics layer 
This layer can be seen as the conveyor through 
which the products are moved. This can be roads, 
trucks and sea lanes which compose a network, 
providing services to producers and consumers.  
The logistics layer is composed by all the actors 
having access to the content of the container and 
the locations through which the cargo is moved.  
3) The regulatory layer 
This layer can be viewed as the system that 
implements rules of behaviour through fines and 
duties through different agencies and organisations, 
as the Customs Office. As the purpose of these 
organisations is different, their agreement on 
implementing new international initiatives can be 
difficult and conflicts could arise.  
 
International initiatives 
 
International initiatives to improve security have been 
developed in all three layers (Bichou, 2005). 
Standards of security have been specified and all 
actors must comply with the requirements in order to 
facilitate global trade. 
Container Security Initiative (CSI) 
This initiative was announced in January 2002, and 
it was one of the programs established after the 
September 11 2001 terrorists’ attacks. Its goal is to 
make the US ports the last line of defence and not 
the first as it was before. 
 
The core elements of this initiative are: 
 
 Identify high risk containers with advanced 
information and technological tools. 
 Pre-screen containers as early as possible in 
the supply chain before loading. 
 
Simulation model 
 
The developed Arena model simulates the 
processes of inspection in the CSI security scheme 
from the arrival of a container to the port until its 
shipment. The objective of this model is to visualize 
the impact in the lead time and consequently in the 
safety stock of a company, by varying factors such 
as inspection percentage (M), equipment resources 
(N) and percentage of containers released after 
inspection (S). The different values tested are: 
 
 
Lead times at ports 
 
With the assumption that containers arrive to the port 
1.5 days prior to scheduled departure, we observe 
that the increase in the percentage of inspected 
containers makes the containers miss their vessel. 
The feasibility of the 100% scanning requirement 
would need the containers to arrive much earlier to 
the port. 
Queues at inspection stations 
 
For the number of equipments tested in the 
simulation, the average queues reach values as high 
as 45000 containers for 25% inspection rate. This 
issue is of major concern for big ports as they would 
become highly congested. The number of 
equipments seems to alleviate the system, but the 
length of the queues remains high. 
Safety stock levels 
 
The variability in the lead times affects directly the 
safety stock levels.  With 2 inspection stations the 
lead time is higher but less variable than with more 
stations. The levels of safety stock are multiplied by 
more than 4 times if the inspection rate is 25%. The 
implementation of the 100% scanning would require 
companies to change their inventory policies or even 
change their sourcing strategy. 
Conclusions 
The feasibility of the 100% scanning remains 
doubtful as ports would be congested and containers 
delayed. 
The tradeoff between increasing security and 
influencing global trade should be further analyzed.  
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λ / hr M (%) N S (%) CSL (%)
100 TEU 5 2 98 95
50 TEU 15 3 96,5 90
25 4 95
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